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CHANGING ATTITUDES. 
POLITICS OF MAROONS VERSUS  
POLITICS OF THE GOVERNM ENT  
IN SURINAM
S ilv ia  W .  d e  G r o o t  ( A m s t e r d a m )
Relations between maroons and colonial government in Surinam  have 
had  constant as well as changing features (De Groot 1982a). In  their 
dealings w ith each other these features caused different policies, and a t ­
titudes.
Not only their relationship towards each other influenced policy, but 
also specific circumstances w ithin each community played a p a rt, de­
pending on whether these situations were brought about by in ternal or 
by external factors.
In this paper I wish to  unravel the changing a ttitudes of each group 
w ith respect to  each other, based on their relationship and circumstances.
The setting, the colony and its society 
T h e  c o l o n y
Prom  1650 on, Surinam  developed into a  p lan ta tion  colony, based on a 
system  of slave labour, until 1667 under English and thereafter under 
D utch authority. U ntil 1795 Surinam  was owned by the C hartered  Soci­
ety, a trium virate consisting of the D utch West Indian Company, the  City 
of A m sterdam  and Cornelis van Aerssen van Sommelsdijk, who together 
adm inistered the colony under supervision of the States General. U ntil 
1816 government was enforced by a governor, a Political Council and a 
Council of Justice.
From 1799 to 1814 Surinam  was a B ritish pro tectorate. The system  of 
adm inistration  was replaced in 1838, and again in 1865, 1937 and  1954, 
un til independence in 1975.
In the 17th and 18th century two groups mainly wanted to  profit by 
the country: namely the Directors of the Chartered Society and the p lan­
ta tio n  owners. In spite of their often conflicting interests, an unstable 
equilibrium  was m aintained and great fortunes were m ade by b o th  for 
more th an  a century.
Prom the end of the eighteenth century onwards the colony fared badly 
after a period of prosperity. The causes were: the m aroon guerilla wars,
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the  growing absenteeism  of p lan tation  owners, the raising of exorbitant 
loans, a crisis on the A m sterdam  exchange, the French Revolution, the 
Napoleonic wars, the prohibition of slave trade and, in 1863, the abolition 
of slavery.
T h e  p l a n t a t i o n  a n d  t h e  s l a v e s
The num ber of slaves im ported from  West Africa into Surinam  is esti­
m ated  to  have been between 300,000 and 350,000. The p lan tation  owner 
was confronted by a slavepopulation outnum bering the whites by 25 to  1 
in  1738, 15 to  1 in  1786 and 6 to  1 in 1830. Especially in the eighteenth 
century the owner lived in a constant fear of slave uprisings and th a t 
was far from  groundless. The slaves were m ostly hostile, either overtly or 
covertly, as their m asters, subject to  great tensions, resorted to  a rb itra ry  
treatm en t and atrocities.
The reactions of the slaves were manifold and had  a num ber of causes, 
which can be pu t in the following points:
• The uprooting and the transfer from Africa to  America caused feel­
ings of shock, isolation, and homesickness;
• Their rightless position in the p lan tation  system;
• The m altreatm ent by the m asters (i.e. inhum an working conditions 
and inhum an punishm ents).
Their reactions can be classified as: adap ta tion , passive resistance, 
open resistance, sm all” m arronage, revolt and m arronage. A daptation  
was difficult, gradual and usually a process of long duration  during which 
the p lan ta tion  system  was accepted and in  which the establishing of family 
relationship and kinship were im portant factors; passive resistance con­
sisted m ainly in pretending illness, or dodging work; open resistance m an­
ifested itself in sabotage, poisoning, selfm utilation, conspiration; “sm all” 
m arronage in tem porarily  leaving the p lan tation  to  avoid punishm ent, to 
visit a  wife or kinsm an on another p lan tation  or to  assist religious gather­
ings. Revolts and m arronage occurred m ostly on one or two plantations 
a t a time. The slaves in Surinam  never united  to  carry out a large-scale 
rising.
If these revolts were not quelled, they often resulted in looting and 
setting fire to  the p lan tation  and killing m aster and staff, and running 
away to  join the existing groups of maroons (De Groot 1984).
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Eighteenth century: guerilla warfare 
P o l i c y  o f  t h e  c o l o n i s t s
The running away of slaves was already reported  since 1650 and when 
Indian slaves were used these also escaped into the forests or up the rivers 
(the Surinam, the Saram aka and the Coppename river). B oth  Negroes 
and Indians harrassed the p lantations. During this period a group of 
m aroons, who had  settled a t P a ra  Creek and la ter on the Coppename 
river, already num bered several hundred.
Governor van Sommelsdijk who arrived in Suriname in 1683 m ade peace 
w ith the Indians as well as w ith a group of m aroons of whom no more 
was heard afterwards. B ut the num ber of slaves who took to  freedom 
m ounted, thus heightening the unrest in  the colony. After a rising in 
1690 on a Jewish plantation , in  the course of which the owner was killed 
and all the slaves escaped into the forest, the colony was forced to  con­
ceive of a more effective policy to  check the loss of valuable slaves and 
plunder of plantations by the maroons. Many a ttem pts were made. D ur­
ing the governorship of Van Sommelsdijk an arm ed civilian guard had 
been formed, consisting of eleven companies (one of which was Jewish). 
It undertook patro ls against maroons, bu t w ithout much success, so th a t 
from  1730 onwards soldiers were also used, the penalties for running 
away were m ade more severe: after 1721 it was punished by death. The 
rew ard for the capturing of maroons was regularly increased: in  1685 it 
was 5 florins, in  1698, 25 and la ter still 50. B ut all these measures proved 
unavailing and the num ber of slaves joining the m aroons kept increasing, 
especially after 1712, when panic broke out am ongst the colonists during 
an  invasion by the French Adm iral Jacques Cassard which caused them  to 
send their wives and children, accompanied by their slaves, into the for­
est. The women and children returned, bu t a large num ber of slaves chose 
to  stay away and join the existing groups. At th a t tim e there were about 
400 plantations, about 50,000 slaves and 2,000 whites. More th an  10% 
of the slaves had  run  away. In 1730, after the p lantations had suffered 
m any attacks, a num ber of expeditions were undertaken, which resulted 
in the discovery and destruction of two notorious m aroon villages on the 
Saram aka river. However, Governor M auricius, who came to  Surinam  in 
1742, declared th a t the expeditions had not the intended effect, and  had 
done more damage than  good. They increased the selfconfidence not only 
of the runaways, but also of the slaves and m ade the paths through the 
forest, leading to  the M aroons known to them.
Accordingly he decided to  change the policy of the colony and in 1749 
he examined the possibility of negotiating w ith the m aroons and m aking 
peace w ith them  (as Van Sommelsdijk had done in 1684 and as the English
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had done w ith the m aroons in Jam aica in 1739 where the colonists had 
been exposed to  the same dangers).
P o l i c y  o f  t h e  M a r o o n s
Once the slave’s decision to  become a m aroon had been taken, it was 
necessary to  organize the escape. Usually the routes to  be taken were 
known, because the existing m aroon groups kept furtive contacts w ith 
the slaves of the p lantations. This m eant th a t often fellow slaves and 
kinsmen were reunited. A lthough new m aroons were accepted by the 
existing groups they were nevertheless pu t to  a harsh test. The m en had 
to  prove to  be reliable, had  to  be in itia ted  in guerilla warfare and bo th  
men and women had to  learn to conform to the stern  rules of a  group 
under w artim e stress and authoritive m ilitary leadership w ith stringent 
religious and m oral codes.
The m aroons developed their specific fighting tactics (which, under sim­
ilar circum stances, proved to be the same as in other areas of the Amer­
icas). They attacked plantations out of necessity: they needed weapons, 
women and implements to survive. Acts of revenge on their former m as­
ters sometimes led to bloodshed, arson and m urder. In the forest they 
kept on the move if they were pursued by the m ilitary  expeditions, which 
was often the case. They avoided fighting in open fields, m aintained 
a  network of spies and look-outs and were hardly  ever surprised by the 
whites, who were unused to this kind of tropical warfare and ham pered by 
their often very large tra in  of bearers. They were clever a t luring patrols 
into ambushes, preferably in  the marshes and, being good shots, seldom 
wasted their powder. W henever they built villages they reinforced them  
w ith palhsades and often situated  them  in almost inaccessible places, w ith 
secret entrances. They m ade the best out of the fact th a t they were by far 
outnum bered by the enemy, by attacking in small parties and w ithdraw ­
ing quickly. There was very little  contact between the different m aroon 
groups. The area each particu lar group chose to  move to , often depended 
on where the p lan tation , from which they had come, was situated  and on 
triba l ties and other relationships w ith already existing nuclei of maroons. 
In order to  survive each group needed a relatively large area, where they 
could roam  about easily w ith the possibility of moving their plots under 
horticulture, should a village come under a ttack  and where the hunting 
and fishing grounds were adequate.
P e a c e  s e t t l e m e n t s
As we saw above Governor Mauricius decided to  force the m aroons to 
open peace negotiations by means of a huge expedition, in  spite of the
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opposition of the members of the council, who did not see the good of 
m aking peace at all and shrank from  the expenses of the expedition.
Three m ajor groups of maroons had by now formed: one called the 
Saramakas living upstream  on the Suriname river, one called M atuaris, 
living on the Saram aka river and another called the Djukas, living up­
stream  on a trib u ta ry  of the Marowijne, called Djuka creek. The choice 
fell on the Saramakas and an expedition w ith 1,000 soldiers was sent. 
Contact was made w ith their Chief Adu, negotiations were succesful and 
the peace was based on the treaty  of 1739 m ade w ith the m aroons in 
Jam aica. R atification was to have taken place after a due am ount of 
presents had  been sent to  the maroons. These presents were sent, bu t 
since the reluctant Council considered m ilitary convoys too expensive, 
only a few whites and  bearers made the trip . The group was attacked 
and  all were massacred. Chief Adu, waiting in vain and assuming th a t 
the negotiations were a ruse, resumed guerilla activities and plantations 
were attacked as before.
Only ten  years la te r a new a ttem pt was made. Now, however, it was 
another group, the Djukas, who themselves m ade overtures by leaving 
leaflets on attacked plantations expressing their willingness to  negotiate. 
The colonists adopted a more cautious policy and contacted the m aroons, 
by first sending two slaves tru sted  by bo th  parties and then a peaceful 
expedition. After long palavers the peace treaty  came about in 1760, 
form ulated again in the  same way as the one in Jam aica. Now the Sara­
makas and the M atuaris a t their own wishes followed suite sind peace was 
concluded also w ith them  two years later. M aroons as well as colonists 
rejoiced bu t not for long; from  1765 until 1793 a fierce guerilla war was 
fought by a newly formed group: the Bonis, nam ed after their leader 
Boni. They attacked scores of p lantations and had  their strongholds in the 
m arshes and forests surrounding the p lan tation  area of the Commewyne 
and C ottica rivers near the coast. Their skilled warfare compelled the 
colonists to  build a system  of connecting m ilitary posts encircling the 
p lantations and to ask help from the m other country in the form  of an 
expeditionary army. This army (1,200 men, w ith the help of a corps of 
Black Chasseurs of 300 men (De Groot 1988), succeeded in 1776 after 
heavy fighting and heavy losses in driving the Bonis over the frontier 
river, the Marowyne, into French Guyana. Peace was never m ade w ith 
them  and they continued to bother the colony in term itten tly  until 1793. 
The final blow to their fighting spirit was given by their fellowblacks the 
Djukas, who turned  against them  after having been their allies: the Bonis 
had moved up river and the Djukas felt th a t their free pathway to  the 
coastal area was being threatened, and moreover, they were being set up 
against the Bonis by a sly colonialist policy of playing the two groups 
off against each other. The Param ount Chief of the Djukas m ounted a
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cam paign against the Bonis and killed their old leader Boni as well as 
some of his warchiefs in  1793 (De Groot 1975, 1982b; Hoogbergen 1990).
Nineteenth century: adjustm ents and new attitudes 
M a r o o n  s o c i e t i e s
The peace-settlem ents gave the maroons the opportunity  to  change from 
guerilla fighters into peaceful communities. They could now live in p er­
m anent settlem ents, develop their rules for kinship relations and political 
hierarchies and evolve religious and m oral codes and ensure their means 
of existence.
A lthough the Surinam  maroons date the beginnings of their oral t r a ­
dition from  their struggle for freedom, they are keenly aware of the fact 
th a t Africa is the land of their forefathers. In their cultural p a tte rn  which 
consists o f an am algam ation of various elements, those of African origins 
play a m ost im portan t role.
S t a t e  w i t h i n  a  s t a t e
The peace treaties allowed the maroons a fair am ount of autonomy. A part 
from  the stipulation, which often was a cause of friction, th a t they were to 
deliver new runaways or help to  hunt them  down for, or together w ith the 
colonists, they formed what usually was called a “sta te  w ithin a  s ta te” .
Relationships between maroons and government rem ained strained. A 
historically grown distrust, conditioned by their past as slaves, their long 
struggle to  gain independence and the fear th a t their hardearned liberty 
could be endangered if  they were to  yield to government proposals, p er­
vaded their contacts w ith western civilisation. Nevertheless they had  — 
and still have — a  keen apreciation of the western technological achieve­
m ents and  knowledge, bu t they definitely do not regard their own accom­
plishm ents as inferior. Even though they are not prepared to  sacrifice 
their independent existence and culture, they are not averse to  learning 
ways of furthering their well-being w ithin their own community. Clearly 
the m aroons and the coastal society differed in a ttitudes and opinions 
towards each other. These differences have been conditioned amongst 
other things by attitudes towards the peace treaties: the m aroons were 
convinced th a t it was they who had in itia ted  peace negotiations and th a t 
they had  never been defeated. The whites on the other hand claimed th a t 
they had  enforced peace on the maroons by retaliating. According to  the 
m aroons the peace treaties regulated freedom and autonom y w ithin their 
own region. The whites considered the benefit of the treaties to  be the 
prevention of renewed attacks and the diminishing of new m aroons. The
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m aroons considered th a t the large am ount of presents which was sent 
to  them  regularly, was p a rt and parcel of the treaty. The government 
however regarded them  to be a special favour. The m aroons feared th a t 
the whites would renew hostilities and th a t they (the m aroons) would be 
recaptured as slaves; the colonists feared th a t the m aroons, either sin­
gle or together, would renew guerilla activities and thus ru in  the colony. 
These convictions, together w ith feelings of pride and  prestige, m ade giv­
ing in and compromise difficult. The ambivalent a ttitudes of b o th  parties 
influenced attitudes whenever the circumstances changed.
P o l i c i e s  o f  i s o l a t i o n  a n d  i n t e g r a t i o n
Efforts to  stress isolation from or integration in the p lan ta tion  colony of 
the maroons changed several times from 1650 onwards. I have divided 
these changing policies into the following periods.
• From 1650 to  1793 guerilla war waged interm ittently . W hile the 
maroons sought to  live in freedom, by hiding deep in the forest, and 
occasionally attacking plantations, the colonists sent patro ls and 
armies in order to  get their property back or to  destroy the m aroons. 
This was a special kind of contact th a t can be considered to  be a 
policy of isolation on the p art of the m aroons and of in tegration  on 
the part of the colonists.
• From  1793 to  1835, after the last group of m aroons ceased to  bother 
the colony, b o th  parties were content, where possible, to  lead a sep­
ara te  existence. They m aintained this policy, apart from  occasions 
when parties of m aroons, whose num bers were determ inated by the 
peace treaty, came to  the p lan ta tion  areas to  smuggle or sell their 
products, m ainly wood, for food and im plements. They retu rned  to  
their regions as soon as business was completed.
• From 1835 to  1856 several changes in the circumstances of bo th  
occurred. Slowly the m aroon population sta rted  to  grow. Their 
precarious balance of existence was often disturbed, and in times 
of want bigger groups came to  the p lantations for supplem entary 
provision. Fear of renewed hostilities was diminishing. Slave trade 
had  been prohibited and the lack of supplies forced the p lan tation  
owners to be more careful w ith their slaves th an  before. M arronnage 
diminished. In 1835, 1837 and 1838 new clauses were inserted in 
the old treaties, which gave the m aroons more freedom to move — 
in num ber as well as in space. Many of them  used this freedom 
to come down the rivers w ith wood to trade or to  smuggle w ith 
the slaves of the plantations. Efforts of the government, first to 
regulate the trade by enforcing a pass system, then to  concentrate
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the m aroons in special areas in order to  keep them  under control 
were to  no avail, and only strained relationships.
• Prom  1856 to  1863 the colony, confronted w ith the failure of its  pol­
icy and w ith a new im portant development, nam ely the irreversable 
process leading to  abolition of slavery, now decided to  change its 
policy towards the maroons decisively, realizing th a t in  view of the 
dreaded shortage of manpower they needed to  take m easures. They 
in itia ted  a policy to  use the un tapped  source of m aroons and draw 
them  into the p lan tation  economy. The trea ty  regulations of 1760 
and  1835 were changed in 1856 and the m aroons were given com­
plete freedom to  move. Their param ount Chiefs were now payed 
a salary and the sending of presents was abandoned. Parties of 
government-officials were sent to  the different m aroon groups to 
convince them  of the advantages of trading w ith, and working for 
the colony. The maroons however were reluctant to  come, because 
they knew from  experience th a t the self-interested whites stood 
m ost to  gain from this, and they decided only to  act in accordance 
w ith it if  their own purpose could be served. They refused to  re tu rn  
to  he p lantations as labourers (De Groot 1977).
• From  1863 to  well after the tu rn  of the century the m aroons were 
very much left to  their own devices. They continued to  grow in 
num bers, traded  w ith the coastal area, carried freight up and down 
the fast flowing, rock strewn rivers, were involved in jobs as lum ber­
jacks, and indulged in other tem porary  work such as b a la ta  bleed­
ing, and m igrated for shorter or longer periods to  the coastal areas. 
The colony lost interest in them , as they were involved in  handling 
im m igrants from  Asia who were to  save their rem aining plantations 
from  complete desintegration.
Twentieth, century: modernization 
D e v e l o p m e n t  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t
The N etherlands’ political policy of the early 1900’s called “E thical sys­
tem ” was aim ed a t the economic and social advancement of the colonial 
population  by means of education, improved medical services and agri­
cultural m ethods and by carrying out public works. The effort to  improve 
Surinam ’s economic situation  was linked to  the o ther country’s long term  
aim  a t curtailing her own expenditure. In view of this policy a tten tion  in 
Surinam  was once again drawn to the isolated groups of m aroons: they 
were of no productive value to the colony, they lived according to  their 
own political and religious codes, evade adm inistrative jurisdiction and,
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in  short, one had no hold on them . All this had  to  be changed, for their 
sake and th a t of the colony, and while prom oting their welfare, the dis­
charge of a “m oral deb t” towards a neglected group would give ethical 
satisfaction. These considerations gave rise to  the proposal to  appoint an 
adm inistrative official (called “postholder” ), to  give elementary, secular 
education as well as agricultural guidance and simple medical aid to  one 
of the m aroon societies: the Djukas, now living along another trib u ta ry  of 
the Marowyne river: the Tapanahoni. This “development p ro jec t” avant 
la lettre failed. Some reasons for this are given below.
The government labelled the enterprise as an experim ent. This m eant 
th a t there was little  continuity: financial provision was to  be m ade once 
a year and the am ount determ ined by short te rm  success or failure. The 
governm ent’s inadequate knowledge of the situation  inland resulted in 
wrong instructions and ineffective advice to  the executer of the project. 
The D juka community resented the whole p lan  as they had  not been told 
about it beforehand and certainly had  not been consulted.
The postholder took the task upon him  single-handed. In spite of his 
dedication the scope of the project was too large for one m an. He know the 
D juka society well and felt sym pathy for them . Nevertheless his position 
and  feelings were ambivalent: he anticipated the same m ateria l results as 
his employers although he laid more stress on the morad side of the work. 
Preference was given to non-C hristian  education because the a ttem pts 
m ade by M oravian Brothers had  failed. A lthough the postholder praised 
the high m oral standards of the Djukas, he found their religious practices 
abhorrent. He regarded western civilization as being inseparable from  
C hristianity  and thought th a t by a “backdoor policy” as he called it, the 
Djukas would come to adopt Christianity as a  n a tu ra l course of event (De 
G root 1969).
R e a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  M a r o o n s
As we have seen, the Djukas had  mixed feelings towards western civiliza­
tion. They had  become even more convinced th a t the balance of political 
and religious power w ithin their society would be upset, should they fall in 
w ith the proposed development project. A lthough the Param ount Chief 
and High Priest are the personification of power one cannot speak of an 
au tocratic  system. A dm inistrative as well as religious organizations have 
to  exercise their power on basis of dependence connections. Political m a­
noeuvring is useful in the wielding of power. If the colonial adm inistration  
is drawn into these manoeuvres than  it is looked upon as “intriguing w ith 
the w hites” and is closely related  to  treason (Thoden van Velzen 1966). 
The activities of the postholder often gave rise to  resistance among the
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Djukas, for he sometimes played one person or faction against the other 
while asking for help, thus upsetting  the precarious balance.
The religious system  of the m aroon society is aim ed a t giving protection 
against supernatural dangers. Any encroachment upon this system  can 
have harm ful results for the individual as well as for the community (Van 
W etering 1973, 1975; Thoden van Velzen/van W etering 1988). The fear 
th a t the u ltim ate  intention of the development project was to  overthrow 
this religious system  was not removed by the project agent who, as we 
saw, him self followed an insidious “backdoor” policy.
The project, s tarted  in  1919, was discontinued in 1925 by the govern­
ment and the postholder was recalled. The lack of success — naturally
blam ed on the executor of the project and on the Djuka community. 
The la tte r, the  government felt, had  sabotaged any m easure adopted to 
improve their welfare and had not shown any appreciation of the govern­
m en t’s good intentions.
M i g r a t i o n  p o l i c i e s
We have seen th a t the m aroons gradually got more and m ore used to 
taking shorter or longer trips to  the coastal area in  order to  earn money 
by trading, river-transpo rt, and lumberjacking. During the tu rn  of the 
century a minor, but intensive goldrush occurred in the frontier area 
between French Guyana and Surinam. Many maroons served as carriers of 
freight and labourers for the treasure hunters who had  rushed to  the area. 
This opportunity  for earning money soon dwindled to  nothing together 
w ith the yield of gold from the placers.
Up to  World W ar II the maroons were affected more or less in the same 
way by this m igration policy. The men left their village for varying periods 
in order to earn enough to  buy provisions in the city before returning home 
and sharing them  between their wifes and relatives; they perform ed their 
duties in their community and sta rted  out on the next journey (Price 
1975).
A fter 1945 this p a tte rn  changed in some respects. M igrating became 
much more intensive. M any more maroons got involved in the money 
and labour economy of the coastal area. A lthough they still are m ainly 
unskilled, the variety of possibilities has grown. As a result o f a com­
prehensive development plan for Surinam, they could find work in  the 
constructions of airfields, roads, in m ining (bauxite) and the building of 
a hydroelectric dam. In spite however of the tim e spent working alongside 
people other th an  their kinsmen, the m aroons do not seem to integrate 
in the m ultiracial coastal society. They keep very much to  themselves, 
do not m ix with other groups not even w ith other maroons groups. In­
tegration  through m arrying a creole girl is rare. Even if  a m aroon does
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decide to  stay and live in these new surroundings he will frequent m ostly 
kinsmen, will not break habits which have been formed by his religion sind 
culture and stay in  contact w ith his hom estead. Only recently a  small 
num ber of them  have received a western education. It m ust be said th a t 
the government and the people of the coastal area sire reluctan t in  giving 
the m aroons any special treatm ent or consideration. Housing conditions 
such as the government’s special guesthouses for m aroons are very poor 
indeed. They therefore prefer to  rent cabins in the backyards of landlords 
who profit excedingly from  this set-up . Housing conditions are poor also 
here, and rents are relatively high, bu t the m aroons feel free to  move and 
can choose w ith whom they want to  share their tiny rooms.
Their labour is appreciated ra ther highly, but th a t does not m ean th a t 
they are trea ted  b e tte r or even on a level w ith their co-workers. They 
have up to  this day been considered as “heathen” unkem pt, boorish, 
uneducated “bushnegroes” . There is on the other hand also a good deal 
of rom anticizing about them : intellectual creoles, looking for identity, 
find in their heroic history a source of pride. Moreover, the creoles hold 
the m aroon magic in awe, even though, or because, it ressembles their 
own syncretized religious beliefs.
M igration to the coastal area in such m ounting num bers as has occurred 
in the last years, has consequences for those staying behind: shortage 
of m anpower for building houses and boats, clearing agricultural plots, 
perform ing religious and political duties. The b irth ra te  is falling and the 
structure  of their society is threatened. This again encourages em igration.
The coastal area which already is suffering from  a  high ra te  of unem ­
ployment has little  to  offer and more often than  not the m aroons live in 
miserable conditions. In 1975 the government considered a new policy. 
In order to  clear the city and its surroundings of some of its poor, they 
drew up a p lan  which features building welfare centres in the  interior. In  
these centres, focussed on growing oil palms and producing and selling the 
oil, and provided w ith a ttrac tive  m odern facilities, they hoped to  induce 
those maroons who live in their own region to stay there, and those who 
have m igrated  to  come back. This severely criticized plan  never came 
to  life. Many plans, products of governmental policies, have failed for a 
m ultitude of reasons as we have seen above. Only if the m aroons can be 
firmly convinced th a t their m arginal society will really profit from  the 
project — and it is not easy to  convince them  of the benefits of profound 
changes — will they be persuaded to  take the risk of partic ipating  in it. 
Only then has such a project any chance of success. The m aroons are 
hardworking, clever, cooperative and inventive people if they believe in a 
cause and are given the correct tools.
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Population of Surinam in History
T A B L E  1.
Year Slaves W hites P lan tations
1668 714 (men) 2,100 400
1738 57,000 2,100 400
1786 50,000 3,350 500
1791 53,000 3,300 591
1830 53,000 8,500 451
1863 33,600 16,500 162
T A B L E  2.
Year Maroons Indians M anum itted Former slaves
1863 8,000 2,000 5,600 33,600
Year Maroons Indians Coastal Total
People population
1924 18,163 2,580 112,800 133,543
1964 27,698 7,287 289,226 324,211
1971 39,500 10,200 333,500 383,200
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T A B L E  3.
1964 census 1971 census
Creoles 114,961 36% 118,000 31%
H industani 112,633 35% 143,000 37%
Indonesian 48,463 15% 58,000 15%
Chinese 5,339 1.7% 6,400 2%
European 4,293 1.3% 4,000 1%
Maroons 27,698 9% 39,500 10%
Indians 7,287 2.3% 10,200 3%
Others 3,627 1.1% 5,100 1%
Total 324,211 100% 383,200 100%
T A B L E  4.
M aroons 1964 census 1971 census
Djuka 14,597 53% _
Saramacca 8,872 32% --
Param aca 1,632 6% --
M atuari 1,391 5% --
Boni (Surinamese)* 279 1% --
Kwinti 117 0.5% --
Others 820 2% --
Total 27,698 100% 39,500
*Boni (French) ±  3,000
